YVALDIS
IV · Economy

Lessons from other games

Document 39 · 43 min read

Owner's question (11/03/2026): "o tokenomics está bem robusto? pegamos e aprendemos com outros NFTs que não tiveram bom desempenho?" ("is the tokenomics robust enough? did we learn from other NFTs that did not perform well?"). The short answer was: the design blocks the classic failures, but only Axie, Ronin and the 2021 land collapse were written up. This document gathers the cases, with sources, and ties each one to one of our rules and to a risk that remains. The main mechanisms became model scenarios and tests (modelos/tokenomics_v2.py, output §15).

How to read it. Every fact about another project has a reference [n], in the list at the end. The excerpts copied from each source, the access date and the address are in 39-fontes. Token prices come from the CoinMarketCap and CoinGecko pages on the access day (11/03/2026) and change over time; they show the size of the fall and predict nothing. A number we could not find in a source does not appear in the text: it is in the "Numbers without a source" list. Other projects' promises appear in quotation marks, as quotes.

What this document does not do. It changes no rule by itself: it proposes. The nine proposals, P1 to P9, were adopted by the owner on 11/03/2026 ("pode aplicar", recorded in 00), and the rules live in 38, 14 and 15. The section on each case describes the risk that remained before adoption and says what adoption solved.

1. Axie Infinity (SLP, AXS) and the Ronin bridge

What happened. In November 2021, an economist interviewed by Forkast said the model depended on "the number of new players joining each month is greater than the number of current players", and described scholarships as "an essential step of ensuring there are holders in the ecosystem for people to sell SLP to" [4]. Daily active users fell from 2.5 million in November 2021 to 1.2 million in April 2022, and the SLP price began to decline in the late summer of 2021, with "rapid inflation of the SLP supply" [3]. At the end of January 2022 the game created four times more SLP per day than Axie breeding burned; the studio cut SLP from adventure mode and daily quests [5]. On March 23, 2022 the Ronin bridge was drained, and the theft was only discovered on March 29 [1]. Five of the nine validator keys were taken: four from Sky Mavis and one from Axie DAO [1]. The FBI attributed the theft of $620 million to the Lazarus and APT38 groups, linked to North Korea [2].

The mechanism that broke. The reward was new emission, and the buyers were the people coming in to play. When the inflow slowed, emission far outran the burn and the price went with it. At the bridge, one company controlled almost all the keys needed to sign, and nobody saw the outflow for six days.

Our rule that answers it. Fixed supply, no minting, and reserve plus treasury releasing at most 50% of the previous quarter's burn (38 §A). The season comes from the reserve and is capped at 25% of the previous season's burn (38 §D): it returns part of what was spent, it creates no token. Buying comes from in-game consumption, not from newcomers (38 §C). NFTs give no power, so there is no "Axie" to buy on entry (00 E1). Bridge and treasury with multiple signatures and per-withdrawal limits (14 §11, 08).

The risk that remains. Token demand is still people spending in the game. If the inflow stops, buying falls: in the model, with entry stopped at month 36, selling is stuck at the floor in 73 of the following 85 months (output §15.2). The bridge rule did not say how many keys, held by whom, or how an abnormal outflow is detected. P7 (adopted on 11/03/2026, 38 §E) set independent signers, a timelock on large outflows and a public alert, with the numbers in Phase 2.

2. STEPN (GST, GMT)

What happened. STEPN's daily active users on Solana peaked at 104K in May 2022 and fell from then on; Naavik wrote that "the inflow of new players is required to fund the ROI of older players", and that GST fell more than 95%, to $0.13 [7]. When the app announced it would cut GPS for mainland China accounts at 24:00 on July 15, 2022, GST fell from $2.08 to $1.53 and GMT from $1.24 to $0.83 [6]. Monthly active users, which peaked at 705,452 in May 2022, fell almost 95%, to 42,965 in February 2023 [8].

The mechanism that broke. To start earning, a new player bought a sneaker (NFT) and GST to level up. That entry purchase paid the earnings of those already in. When the inflow stopped, the buyer disappeared.

Our rule that answers it. There is no entry purchase: the game is free to play, NFTs are cosmetic only and nothing has to be bought to take part in the season (00 E1, 38 §D). The model's STEPN test measures how much of the dollars that buy token come from players in their first three months: in base, 11.7% (months 13 to 120), below the newcomer share of the population (15% at month 36), because deposits and minting are veteran-only (output §15.1). It became a design guardrail and a test: below 20% over the period and 25% in any month; a $3 "entry kit" per newcomer already breaks the guardrail (mutant).

The risk that remains. The figure is an upper bound and comes from assumptions: the model assumes newcomers spend like veterans. At launch everyone is a newcomer (18.3% in months 1 to 12), and in a new-chapter month the share rises (20.5% in the worst month of the growth scenario). Only the beta measures the real number. P3 (adopted on 11/03/2026, 38 §I) became an alarm: above 20% of the dollars that buy token in a quarter, after month 12, the economy owner reviews.

3. DeFi Kingdoms (JEWEL)

What happened. The official documentation says about 386.5 million JEWEL were emitted from the "Gardens" (liquidity rewards) before emissions ended early, that 283,644,055 JEWEL were locked and that the maximum supply became 125 million [12]. In June 2022, the Horizon bridge of the Harmony network the game ran on lost $100 million; the FBI attributed the theft to the same Lazarus and APT38 groups [10]. Two months later, the game confirmed it would leave Harmony completely [9]. CoinGecko shows an all-time high of $22.52 and a price of $0.004405 on the access day [11].

The mechanism that broke. The main reward was yield: emission to those who locked liquidity, much of it locked to unlock later. Every reward became a future sale. Then the security failure on the host network forced a change of network.

Our rule that answers it. No staking with interest, no APY, no paid liquidity incentive (38 introduction and §G, 14 §3). The deposit locks token but yields nothing and returns only the nominal amount (38 §B). Contracts on the EVM standard so we can move network (08, "Network").

The risk that remains. The network and bridge we plan to use (Immutable zkEVM, proposed in 08) belong to another company. A problem there hits us, as Horizon hit DeFi Kingdoms, and moving is expensive even with EVM contracts.

4. The Sandbox, Decentraland and Otherside

What happened. The average price of land sold in Decentraland peaked at $37,238 in February 2022 and was $5,163 on August 1; in The Sandbox, the average fell from about $35,500 in January to about $2,800 in August [15]. In October 2022, DappRadar data showed 38 "active users" in 24 hours in Decentraland and 522 in The Sandbox, counting wallets that interact with the contracts [13]; Decentraland answered that it had about 8,000 daily active users [14]. At the Otherside mint, in May 2022, Yuga Labs sold some 55,000 deeds at 305 APE (about $5,800 each) and took in over $318.7 million; the transactions consumed over 64,000 ETH in gas [16], and the company refunded gas for failed transactions [17]. In March 2024, the Otherdeed floor price was 0.23 ETH, about $929 [18].

The mechanism that broke. Land sold as scarce before there was a game to use it. The price was a bet on future traffic; when the traffic did not come, the land stayed empty and idle at no cost.

Our rule that answers it. Land is worth its use and never gives power; periodic auctions, new land only above 85% occupancy, caps per KYC and per clan, a Harberger tax, the tax doubling after 60 days without activity and an auction after 120 (15). A deposit per deed (38 §B). No sale before the legal opinion (00 L2). The model (output §15.4) shows that, with half the plots held by speculators, the inactivity rule returns all of them to auction in month 4, and the speculator pays 6% of the declared value every 4 months (1% tax) or 3% (0.5%). The deposit returns no plot: it only costs idle capital.

The risk that remains. Three, all measured in the aggregate model (no per-plot activity):

  • The "pasture" loophole (closed by P8): 15 let an owner suspend the tax doubling and the inactivity count by saying they were away, with no maximum duration. A speculator in pasture forever never went to auction; only Harberger took the plot away. P8 (adopted on 11/03/2026) limits pasture to 60 days every 12 months per plot with a deed, with Harberger applying during pasture; in the worst case the plot goes to auction in 6 months (output §15.4).
  • Rebuying: if half of each auction goes back to speculators, the idle share falls to about 14% and stays there.
  • Euphoria: the tax only holds speculation back if the plot rises less than the tax costs. In a run like 2021's, it does not. The door that 15 kept open for an early sale of plots, before the game, was closed by P9 (adopted on 11/03/2026).

5. Alien Worlds (TLM)

What happened. In April 2021, Alien Worlds was described as the most popular blockchain game and the first to pass 100,000 wallets, with the warning that accounts were counted, not people [21]. A 2021 estimate gave 759,600 users [22]. ForkLog wrote that a significant share of accounts were bots mining TLM, that bots for the game sold for $200 to 800 and that their activity declined with the TLM price in spring 2022 [19]. In November 2023, the game's official account said at least 1.6 million accounts were bots, and that the game had been rebalanced "to reward humans more and bots less" [20]. On the access day, TLM was 99.80% below its peak [23].

The mechanism that broke. Rewards per account and per action, with accounts almost free. For a bot, each new account was one more "player" entitled to emission, and the wallet count became marketing.

Our rule that answers it. One KYC, one eligible account; season weighted by verified play (distinct players traded with, variety); a small season; a $25 withdrawal cap in the first 90 days; ban triggers at 5% and 10% bots (14 §11, 38 §D and §4).

The risk that remains. KYC with a rented real identity gets through. The model (output §15.3) runs bots passing KYC at 2× and 5× the current assumption: with 30% bots among accounts, they take 11.4% and 24.3% of the season; if they also defeat the verified-play weight, 51.7%, and the season per human falls from $0.163 to $0.084 per month at month 60. The price barely changes, because the season is small and is already assumed fully sold. The harm is diluting humans, not crashing the token. The model has no farming in the creator economy or in gold. P4 (season held 30 days, with clawback for a banned account) and P5 (per-account cap of 10 times the median) were adopted on 11/03/2026 (38 §D); the model only sees them in the aggregate (output §13 and §15.3).

6. MIR4 (DRACO, Wemade, WEMIX)

What happened. On the global servers, 100,000 Darksteel, an in-game ore, turned into 1 DRACO, which went to the WEMIX wallet [24]. Wemade said bots were used mainly to mine Darksteel, that it had banned more than 1.1 million accounts and that it would run Turing tests inside the game [26]. The game reached more than 1.4 million concurrent users [27]. In South Korea, the local version had no token earning: the game rating body (GRAC) did not allow blockchain games [25], refused to rate "P2E" games, which in practice banned them [31], and was cancelling the rating of 32 of them [27]. In November 2022, the five large Korean exchanges (DAXA) announced they would delist WEMIX on December 8, because far more tokens were circulating than the plan submitted to them; the price fell almost 70%, to about $0.49 [28]. The gap was nearly 30% [29], and the Seoul court dismissed Wemade's request to block the delisting [30]. In 2025 WEMIX was delisted again, after a $6.2 million theft on the Play Bridge [32].

The mechanism that broke. An in-game resource, mineable without limit, converted straight into a token. Playing with a bot became the cheapest way to "play". And the platform token lost its exchanges by misreporting how much was circulating.

Our rule that answers it. Gold and resources never become token by any path (00 E2, 14 §1); valuable resources respawn in real time with a cap (14 §11). A fixed, public release schedule and a monthly treasury report with release against the 50% cap (38 §E). Nothing with real value before the legal opinion (00 L2); token only for verified 18+ (00 L5).

The risk that remains. The Korean rule targets exactly the "conversion of in-game rewards (i.e., game points, free rewards, in-game currency, etc.) into real currency" [31]. Our season and the creator payout are, legally, a form of that; the legal-opinion gate covers launch, but each country's law can change later. The treasury report did not compare on-chain circulating supply with the published schedule; the economic report in P1 (adopted on 11/03/2026, 38 §E) now compares them.

7. Big Time (BIGTIME)

What happened. The token started trading on exchanges in October 2023, with about 5% of supply airdropped to players; Delphi wrote that "the game lacks a sizable active player base" [34]. The price rose 250% in five days; the fully diluted value was about $1.2 billion against a market cap of about $40 million [33]. The token has no allocation to team or investors, a 5 billion cap and is used to refine, craft and upgrade items [35]. The company says players transacted over $230 million without it selling a single token, and that it sells only "Time Crystals", a non-crypto premium currency (sponsored press release, unverified) [36]. The all-time high was $0.9827 on December 5, 2023; on the access day it was 99.32% below [37].

The mechanism that broke. Almost all supply was still to be emitted to whoever played, and the first arrivals came for the token, not the game. With no team selling, emission to farmers was enough to press the price.

Our rule that answers it. All supply exists from the start, and what leaves the reserve depends on the burn, not on an emission schedule (38 §A). The season does not depend on holding a paid NFT (38 §D).

The risk that remains. At launch, our circulating supply is also small (testers and the pool) against a large stored supply: in the model, the price index reaches 2.53 in month 8 with a shallow pool (38 §G). The three launch safeguards exist for this, and the model does not simulate them.

8. Illuvium (ILV)

What happened. The open beta was delayed in August 2021 [39]. In June 2022, the land sale took in more than $72 million, and 239,388 sILV2, the game's own staking token (about $22 million), would be burned; the game was set to launch "later this year" [38]. By design, "100% of revenue generated w/ the ecosystem flows back to the vault and then is distributed back to those staking $ILV" [40]. The games shipped on the Epic Games Store in July 2024 [41]. In December 2024 ILV was 98% below its high, and the founder admitted the game had been "too heavy on micro-transactions while lacking in terms of its basic gameplay" [42]. CoinMarketCap shows an all-time high of $2,868.95 on May 29, 2021 [43].

The mechanism that broke. The token was designed as revenue share for lockers, land was sold years before the game and part of what came in from the sale was the game's own token, burned right after. The game arrived charging before it was fun.

Our rule that answers it. No buyback with studio revenue, no staking with interest (38 §C and §E, 00 V7). No sale before the legal opinion and the game (00 L2, 14 §2). Gameplay first; the real-money economy only after the game proves fun without it (08, "Implementation order"; 14 §12).

The risk that remains. The creator payout is a share of each sale, in token; the legal opinion has to say whether it reads as revenue sharing (38 §6). And 15 described an early sale of plots before the game; P9 (adopted on 11/03/2026) closed it.

9. Star Atlas (ATLAS, POLIS)

What happened. In 2021, before there was a game, the project sold NFT posters for just under $7 million and announced token sales, with a total supply of 36 billion ATLAS and 360 million POLIS [44]; it closed a $2 million public sale, "adding to the $41 million in sales it has already raised in NFTs" [45]. Animoca Brands committed to buy over $3 million in ships, and revenue from asset sales would fund development [46]. In September 2022 there was only a pre-alpha demo, with the plan of a "vertical slice" of the game [47]. In November 2025, a wallet vendor's blog (a weaker source) still spoke of iterating "before the full Unreal Engine 5 client ships" [49]. ATLAS peaked at $0.2773 on September 4, 2021 and was 99.96% below on the access day [48].

The mechanism that broke. Selling the asset catalogue years before the game. The money arrives first and the obligation to deliver comes later; buyers pay for a game that does not exist yet.

Our rule that answers it. No private round, no public sale, no token sold before the game exists (14 §2, 00 L2). The proof of concept costs zero and comes before any economy (00).

The risk that remains. The same as Illuvium: the early plot-sale option that 15 kept, closed by P9 (adopted on 11/03/2026).

10. Gods Unchained (GODS): a survivor

What happened. The first card sale, in 2018, raised nearly $1.2 million and placed over 500,000 cards [50]; in 2019 Immutable raised $15 million [51] and sold out the genesis packs at 33,333 ETH [52]. "Gods Unchained is free-to-play"; players earn Stars, Flux and packs by leveling up and winning ranked games, and spend Flux to fuse two identical plain cards into a card minted as an NFT [53]. In 2022, an Immutable executive said "the play-to-earn model that shaped the first iteration of blockchain gaming creates an unsustainable ecosystem" [54]. GODS left the weekend rewards and the daily reward got a cap of 10 ranked matches per day [55], larger for higher-quality decks and rising with the player population [56]. The founder said people trade cards to use in the game, not because of the Ethereum price [57]. In 2024, the team became able to change the daily reward periodically and banned close to 4,000 suspected bot or multi-accounting users [59]. In October 2026 the game was still getting updates [60]. GODS peaked at $8.83 in December 2021 and was 99.76% below on the access day [58].

What went right. The game came before the token: cards sold and played years before the GODS peak. A plain card is not an NFT; only what the player fused by playing becomes an NFT. Earning with a daily cap, adjustable rules and continuous bot bans.

Our rule that answers it. NFTs cosmetic only and minted only by characters with history (08, "Anti-abuse rules"); season weighted by verified play (38 §D); game before economy (14 §12).

The risk that remains. Even a survivor saw its token below 1% of its high. The game surviving does not hold the price: our material already says the token can lose all its value (38 §5). Where GU does more than we do: a daily cap per account. Our season had no per-account cap; P5 (adopted on 11/03/2026, 38 §D) sets it at 10 times the median of paid accounts. And GU made the reward rise with population, the opposite of what we want: ours rises with the burn, not with the account count.

11. Splinterlands (SPS, DEC): a long survivor

What happened. In July 2022 the game set "a fixed supply of 7.5M SPS tokens per month allocated to ranked battle rewards", and closed "exploits around renting cards for a single day" [61]. In November 2022 it cut about 45% of the team and stopped new games and presales [62]. In 2023 it opened the first phase of its land expansion [63] and replaced requirements that were "very easily circumvented and abused" with a reward multiplier tied to staked SPS, up to 13.3×, saying there had been "no penalty or negative impact from selling" [64]. Daily active wallets fell from over 150,000 to as low as 50,000, and SPS kept hitting all-time lows [65].

What went right and what did not. A fixed reward budget, fighting one-day rentals and continuous tuning kept the game alive since 2018, with a much smaller base. The way out it found was to tie rewards to locked capital.

Our rule that answers it. The season is capped by the burn, which follows activity, instead of a fixed number (38 §D). The studio pays its bills with card and PIX, not with token (38 §E and §I).

The risk that remains. Multiplying rewards by locked token is staking with a yield, which our rule forbids; we do not have that lever, on purpose. Like Splinterlands, we may survive smaller: with entry stopped, the studio's monthly cash falls to half a person by month 120 (output §15.2).

12. Pixels (PIXEL, BERRY)

What happened. In November 2023, with about 115,000 daily active wallets, the founder estimated that only 70,000 were real unique players and proposed a VIP pass of about $35 as a "barrier to withdrawals" of BERRY [66]. In February 2024 BERRY, "an on-chain soft currency with a daily inflation rate of 2%", was retired and replaced by an off-chain currency; the game itself said BERRY was "enabling farmers to grind harder and sell their earnings more easily" [67]. BERRY held outside the game was swapped for PIXEL at 1,000 BERRY for 7.6175 PIXEL [68], and PIXEL launched on Binance on February 19, 2024 [69]. In May 2024 the game said it had passed 1 million daily active users, and the founder called "the ratio between PIXEL spent to PIXEL distributed" the best metric [70]. With Chapter 2, daily active wallets dropped from over 900,000 to 252,000, mostly from removing bots, and rebounded to 428,000 [71]. In November 2024 daily in-game coin inflation had dropped by nearly 84%, and the goal was for players to spend more PIXEL than the game distributes [72]. The game ended 2024 at 283,000 daily active wallets, a reward ratio of 0.5 and monthly net revenue still negative (−10 million tokens in December) [73].

The mechanism that broke. An on-chain soft currency with high inflation is farmed and sold by bots without friction. The active count was, in large part, bots.

Our rule that answers it. Gold, our soft currency, stays off-chain and never becomes token (14 §1 and §10). The ratio of what is distributed to what is spent is a contract rule: the season is at most 25% of the burn (38 §D), a ratio of 0.25 or less by construction. Withdrawal cap and KYC (14 §8 and §11).

The risk that remains. Cleaning out bots crashes the active count; Pixels lost 69% of its wallets in a month. We need to publish verified human actives, not wallets, so we do not depend on a number that will fall when the cleanup works; P1 (adopted on 11/03/2026) has them published in the monthly report.

13. Thetan Arena, Pegaxy and scholarships (YGG)

What happened. In December 2021 Thetan Arena said it had over 7 million users, but on-chain data showed 4,800 daily active users; the count left out those who played off-chain [74]. In June 2022 THC was 99.3% below its high, and players earned ever more THC and ever less in dollars [75]. THC was discontinued on May 2, 2024 and exchanged for THG at a fixed rate [76]. In Pegaxy, VIS was paid to the top three of each race and burned when re-rolling horses; rentals used an escrow account [78]. "VIS (Pegaxy's token) entered into hyperinflation as more players joined" [77], and in July 2022 it lost another 30% in a few days, with hundreds of guilds relying on rewards to keep their scholars [79]. The YGG guild had 29,458 scholarships at the end of March 2022, mostly in Axie [80], and Naavik noted that "increases in scholars are not leading to increases in revenues" [81].

The mechanism that broke. Rewards per match played, and rentals that multiply the number of "workers". Emission grew with the count of accounts playing, and the guild depended on that emission.

Our rule that answers it. The season is not per match: it is a fixed pot set by the burn, split by verified play (38 §D). More accounts split the same pot; they do not increase emission. One KYC, one eligible account (14 §11). NFTs give no power, so there is no "horse" or "hero" to rent out and earn with (00 E1). The rental that exists is of plots, in gold (15).

The risk that remains. Scholarships on the side: a person with KYC lends the account to a "manager". The rule did not say that season eligibility is personal and cannot be delegated; P6 (adopted on 11/03/2026, 38 §D and 14 §11) says it, and a lent account loses eligibility under the terms of use.

14. EVE Online and Roblox DevEx: references outside crypto

EVE Online: what happened. In 2007 CCP appointed an in-world economist, who would publish quarterly reports on inflation, growth and prices [82]. An ISK faucet is a mechanic that creates currency "out of thin air"; a sink destroys it; "the balance between ISK sinks and faucets sets the rate of inflation for the game" [85]. PLEX, introduced in 2008, adds 30 days of game time [83] and is sold between players for ISK, with its value "determined by the player demand" [84]. In 2020 CCP declared "the economy of EVE is in an unsustainable state", said ISK generated by botting had been reduced by 80% and started a shortage phase [86]; the same year PLEX prices dropped 43.5% in a year, while ISK per character kept rising [87]. CCP publishes a monthly economic report with sinks and faucets and corrects it in public when it errs [88].

Roblox DevEx: what happened. Creators exchange earned Robux for money at a fixed rate, if they are 13 or older and have at least 30,000 earned Robux [91]. In September 2025 the rate rose 8.5% [89], from $0.0035 to $0.0038 per Robux [90]. In 2025 creators earned over $1.5 billion through DevEx, and in April 2026 Roblox raised the rate by 42% for spend from age-checked US players aged 18 and over, in eligible games [92].

What went right. EVE: someone responsible for the economy, public monthly measurement, and intervention when faucets outrun sinks. Roblox: a closed loop; the company sets the cash-out rate as a policy lever, with no speculative market in between, a minimum threshold and an age gate.

Our rule that answers it. The gold sink controller tracks a band (37 §1, 33 §10); monthly treasury report (38 §E); creators get 30% of net in token, with a 60-day hold and review above $500 per month (38 §C).

The risk that remains. We had no named economist and no report on the whole economy (gold and token), only on the treasury; P1 and P2 (adopted on 11/03/2026, 38 §E) create the monthly economic report and the economy owner. Our creators are paid in a free-floating token, not at Roblox's fixed rate: they carry the price risk and, at the floor, find no buyer in our pool. And PLEX shows the path we chose not to have: an official channel from money to gold. Without it, a gray market in gold (selling gold for money outside the game) is a risk that only the gold transfer cap and fee (08) contain.

15. Ember Sword (extra): selling land and not delivering the game

What happened. Bright Star raised over $11 million through its initial NFT land sale, could not secure the funding to keep building and said "the current web3 and gaming market made it impossible" [93]. Ember Sword shut down in May 2025 for lack of funding; "the EMBER token has meanwhile plunged to near-worthlessness", and the amount raised appears much lower than the amount pledged [94].

The mechanism that broke. The economy was sold before there was a game, and the studio's cash depended on the crypto market, not on players. It is a different failure from the others: it broke before there was a game economy.

Our rule that answers it. No sale before the legal opinion and the game (00 L2); a zero-cost proof of concept (00); studio cash from card and PIX (38 §I).

The risk that remains. The early plot-sale option that 15 kept, closed by P9 (adopted on 11/03/2026).

Summary table

Case Failure mode Our answer Residual risk
Axie Emission paid by newcomers; bridge with concentrated keys Supply only shrinks; season ≤ 25% of burn; multisig (38 §A, §D; 14 §11) Stopped entry locks exit at the floor (73 of 85 months in the model); bridge numbers in Phase 2 (P7, adopted)
STEPN Entry purchase pays the earnings of those already in No entry purchase; newcomer guardrail < 20% (output §15.1) Real number only in the beta; launch and chapters concentrate newcomers; 20% alarm (P3, adopted)
DeFi Kingdoms Emission yield; failure on the host network No staking with interest; deposit yields nothing; EVM contracts (38 §B, 08) Third-party network and bridge
Sandbox, Decentraland, Otherside Scarce land sold before players Harberger, inactivity, occupancy, KYC cap, no pre-sale (15) Speculators rebuying; pasture with a time limit (P8) and no early sale (P9), adopted
Alien Worlds Bots farming per-account rewards KYC, verified-play weight, small season (14 §11) Rented identity; bots dilute humans (up to 52% of the season in the worst case); hold, per-account cap and personal eligibility (P4, P5, P6, adopted)
MIR4 In-game resource becomes token; misreported supply; local law Gold never becomes token; public schedule; legal opinion (00 E2, L2) Each country's law; on-chain supply checked in the report (P1, adopted)
Big Time Huge future emission to farmers Whole supply from the start, release by burn (38 §A) Small float at launch; shallow pool (38 §G)
Illuvium Revenue share to lockers; land before the game No buyback, no staking, no pre-sale (38 §C, §E) Legal reading of the creator payout (38 §6); early plot sale closed (P9, adopted)
Star Atlas Assets sold years before the game No sale before the game (14 §2) Early plot sale in 15, closed (P9, adopted)
Gods Unchained Survivor; token fell anyway NFT only through history; weighted season Per-account season cap (P5, adopted); price does not follow the game
Splinterlands Smaller survivor; rewards tied to staking Cap by burn; cash in card and PIX Shrinking until it cannot pay a team
Pixels On-chain soft currency farmed by bots Gold off-chain; ratio ≤ 0.25 by contract Active count falls with the cleanup; verified humans in the report (P1, adopted)
Thetan, Pegaxy, YGG Per-match rewards × account rentals Fixed pot by burn; NFTs without power Side scholarships with lent accounts; personal eligibility (P6, adopted)
EVE, Roblox References: economist, report, fixed rate Gold controller; treasury report Economy report and owner (P1, P2, adopted); creators on a floating price
Ember Sword Land sold, game not delivered No sale before the game; cash in card and PIX Early plot sale closed (P9, adopted)

What nobody has solved

Industry problems we do not solve either:

  • The price outside our pool. Every token in this document fell more than 98% from its high, including a survivor's (GODS, −99.76% [58]) and a token with no team allocation (BIGTIME, −99.32% [37]). Our floor exists only in our pool; exchanges and other pools trade at any price (38 §G).
  • Identity. KYC stops the cheap fake account, not the real person who rents out their own identity. Survivors ban in waves (millions in MIR4 [26], thousands in Gods Unchained [59]) and accept seeing the count drop (Pixels [71]).
  • Measuring people, not wallets. A wallet is not a player (Alien Worlds [21], Decentraland [13], Thetan [74]). Nobody has a public, auditable measure of active humans.
  • Earning attracts those who only want to extract. Even the best design attracts people who do not want to play; surviving usually means a smaller base (Splinterlands [65]).
  • Bridges and keys. The largest losses were at bridges (Ronin [2], Horizon [10], Play Bridge [32]), not in the games. Using another company's network trades one risk for another.
  • Law. Korea effectively bans converting game rewards into money [31]. Other countries may follow; the legal-opinion gate only covers launch day.
  • Money to build. Those who sold assets before the game ended up owing a game (Star Atlas, Illuvium, Ember Sword). Those who do not sell need other cash; ours is card and PIX, and the team's time.

Where our design is weaker than a survivor

Read adversarially: what a survivor does that we do not. All the fixes below were adopted on 11/03/2026 (P1 to P6).

  1. EVE has an economist and a report on the whole economy; we only have a treasury report. CCP measures sinks and faucets every month and corrects in public [88]; that is what let it see, in 2020, that the economy was unsustainable [86]. Our 38 §E publishes the treasury, not gold nor the failure signals in this document. Fix: P1 and P2.
  2. Gods Unchained has a daily cap per account; our season does not. There, 10 ranked matches per day [55]. Here, verified-play weighting reduces the weight of repeated patterns, but a very active account (or a farm that passes KYC) has no limit. Fix: P5.
  3. Gods Unchained and Pixels ban and remove what the bot earned; we pay the season at once. Banning later recovers nothing. Fix: P4, a 30-day hold with clawback.
  4. Roblox pays creators at a fixed rate; we pay in a free-floating token. Creators carry the price risk and, at our pool's floor, find no buyer. I do not propose changing it now: paying in money would remove the consumption-linked token buying that drives demand in 38 §C. It is recorded as a conscious trade-off, for the legal opinion and the beta to measure.
  5. EVE has PLEX as an official channel from money to game currency; we forbid every path. The ban protects the token from gold inflation, but leaves room for a gray market in gold. I do not propose changing the rule (00 E2); the measure goes into the report (P1, adopted).
  6. Survivors tune the rules when they fail; we have levers, but not the written trigger. Gods Unchained changes the daily reward periodically [59]; Pixels cut coin inflation by 84% [72]. Our model now measures four failure signals (output §15). Fix: P1 and P3 give each signal a limit and an owner.

Proposed changes, now adopted

This document changed no rule. Each proposal went to 00 with a recommendation, and the owner answered "pode aplicar" on 11/03/2026: all nine are adopted. The last column says where each one lives now; the record is in 00.

# Proposal Motivating case Where it lives now (adopted 2026-11-03)
P1 Public monthly economic report, alongside the treasury's: gold and token sinks and faucets; on-chain circulating supply against the published schedule; newcomer share of the dollars that buy token; season paid to accounts banned later; months with selling stuck at the floor; verified human actives (not wallets) EVE, MIR4, STEPN, Pixels, Alien Worlds 38 §E, 14 §9, 34 §11
P2 Person responsible for the economy: a named person (the owner, at first) signs the report and pulls the published levers EVE 38 §E, 14 §9
P3 Newcomer guardrail as an alarm: if newcomers exceed 20% of the dollars that buy token in a quarter (after the first 12 months), review by the person responsible; never a mandatory entry purchase STEPN 38 §I and §7, 14 §11; test test_novatos_abaixo_da_guarda
P4 Season held 30 days, with clawback: an account banned in the period loses what was held, which returns to the reserve Alien Worlds, MIR4, Pixels, Gods Unchained 38 §D, 14 §5; model in the aggregate (output §15.3)
P5 Per-account season cap: no account receives more than 10 times the median of paid accounts (10 is a proposal, calibrate in the alpha) Gods Unchained, Alien Worlds 38 §D, 14 §5; outside the model (output §13)
P6 Personal season: eligibility is tied to the KYC and cannot be delegated; a lent account loses eligibility under the terms Axie, Thetan, Pegaxy, YGG 38 §D, 14 §11, 08, 34 §5
P7 Bridge and keys: multiple signatures with independent signers, no entity holding enough keys to sign alone; a time lock on large treasury outflows; a public movement alert Ronin, Horizon, Play Bridge 38 §E, 14 §11, 08, 34 §8; numbers in Phase 2
P8 Pasture mode with a limit: at most 60 days every 12 months for a plot with a deed; Harberger keeps applying during pasture Sandbox (model finding, output §15.4) 15, 09, 33 §5; model and test (output §15.4)
P9 Close the land pre-sale: remove the early plot-sale option from 15; land is sold only when the chapter is playable Star Atlas, Illuvium, Otherside, Ember Sword 15, 14 §2 and §12, 08, 00 decision 11

What the model showed (output §15)

The four tests run with the v2 rules without changing any rule parameter; the old scenarios and the numbers in 38 did not change.

Test Result Reading
STEPN (dependence on newcomers) Newcomers pay 11.7% of the dollars that buy token in base (months 13 to 120), 11.0% in growth and 8.1% in stagnation; worst month 13.0% in base, 20.5% in growth There is no entry purchase; the 20% guardrail becomes a test
Entry stops (zero newcomers from month 36) Supply never rises (223.3M burned in 120 months, against 309.7M in base); the pool's real dollars are never negative ($182 thousand at month 120); selling stuck at the floor in 73 of the 85 months after the stop (75 in 120 months, against 2 in base); season per active steady at about $0.16 per month; studio monthly cash always positive, but falling from $79 thousand to $2.3 thousand Nothing breaks; everything shrinks. The cost is exit: whoever wants to sell keeps the token
Account farm (bots through KYC at 2× and 5×) With 30% bots: 11.4% and 24.3% of the season to bots; 51.7% if they also defeat the weight; price almost unchanged. With the 30-day hold and half of the bots banned in the window (assumption, P4), the bots keep 25.9% in the worst case The harm is diluting humans, not crashing the token
Speculative land (half the plots idle) Everything returns to auction in month 4; with 50% rebuying, about 14% stays idle; with unlimited pasture, nothing returns without Harberger The inactivity rule works; pasture with no limit was a loophole. With the P8 limit (60 days every 12 months), the worst case is 6 months idle, and with 50% rebuying the idle share at month 36 rises from 14% to 19%

New tests in modelos/test_tokenomics_v2.py, each with its mutant in modelos/mutantes_tokenomics_v2.py: with entry stopped, supply never rises; with entry stopped, the pool's real dollars are never negative; in base, newcomers below 20% of the dollars that buy token (and 25% in every month); outside pasture, no plot idle more than 4 months with the same owner; with the 60-days-per-12-months pasture (P8), no plot idle more than 6 months with the same owner; and with the clawback of banned bots' season (P4, aggregate), the sum of all buckets stays at 1 billion.

Why 20%. In base the figure is 11.7%, and the worst month of the growth scenario (a new-chapter month) is 20.5%. A 20% limit over the period and 25% in any month leaves room for what the design produces and fails with any mandatory entry purchase: a $3 kit per newcomer already breaks it. A figure above 20% measured in the beta means token demand depends on those who just arrived, which is the STEPN signal. It is the limit of the P3 alarm, and the test test_novatos_abaixo_da_guarda implements it in the model.

Numbers without a source

Numbers that came up in the research and did not go into the text, because we found no source we could check ("sem fonte encontrada"):

  • Axie: SLP from about $0.40 to $0.004; Axie floor price from $340 to $6; a peak of 2.7 million weekly users; share of players who were scholars and the scholarship split (e.g. 30/70); root cause of the Ronin theft (social engineering).
  • STEPN: GST at about $0.02 in November 2022; 482 thousand users in Q3 2022; GST all-time high (sources disagree).
  • DeFi Kingdoms: JEWEL at $1.28 in 2022; share of rewards locked; date of the high; direct impact of Horizon on players.
  • Land: date of the Decentraland peak (sources disagree); Otherdeed floor at mint; total gas of the mint (sources give $123M to $180M; we use none).
  • Alien Worlds: share of accounts that were bots; over 1 million wallets in 30 days.
  • MIR4: DRACO peak and fall.
  • Big Time: number of players; total sold of SPACE and Hourglass.
  • Illuvium: staking yield; number of players.
  • Star Atlas: total ship sales; number of players.
  • Gods Unchained: number of players; size of the weekly GODS pool.
  • Splinterlands: 2021 active-user peak; 1% monthly cut in SPS emission.
  • Pixels: RORS target of 1.1 to 1.5.
  • Thetan and Pegaxy: Thetan's peak actives; VIS high and low; YGG's 70/20/10 split.
  • EVE: date the monthly report replaced the quarterly one.
  • Roblox: figures from the 2024 10-K at the SEC (the page blocked the fetch); the rule for balances earned before September 2025.

References

Excerpts copied from each source in 39-fontes. All accessed on 11/03/2026.

  1. The Block, "Axie Infinity's Ethereum sidechain Ronin hit by $600 million exploit", 2022-03-29. https://www.theblock.co/amp/post/139761/axie-infinitys-ethereum-sidechain-ronin-hit-by-600-million-exploit
  2. BleepingComputer, "FBI links largest crypto hack ever to North Korean hackers", 2022-04-14. https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/fbi-links-largest-crypto-hack-ever-to-north-korean-hackers
  3. The Block, "The decline of Axie Infinity", 2022-05-16. https://www.theblock.co/post/146915/the-decline-of-axie-infinity
  4. Forkast, on Axie's play-to-earn model, 2021-11-01. https://forkast.news/axie-infinity-play-to-earn-model/
  5. Decrypt, "Axie Infinity Making Big Changes to Fix Its Ailing Play-to-Earn NFT Economy", 2022-02-05. https://decrypt.co/92190/axie-infinity-making-big-changes-to-fix-its-ailing-play-to-earn-nft-economy
  6. Decrypt, "Stepn 'Move-to-Earn' Cryptocurrencies Plummet After App Says It Will Block Users in China", 2022-05-27. https://decrypt.co/101510/stepn-move-earn-cryptocurrencies-plummet-gameplay-blocked-china
  7. Naavik, on STEPN's rise and fall, 2022-07-04. https://naavik.co/digest/stepn-rise-fall-future/
  8. AMBCrypto (Dune data), "STEPN users take a step back from running after airdrop misery", 2023-03-07. https://ambcrypto.com/stepn-users-take-a-step-back-from-running-after-airdrop-misery/
  9. The Block, "DeFi Kingdoms to leave Harmony for metaverse-focused blockchain", 2022-08-23. https://www.theblock.co/news/web3/2022-08-23-defi-kingdoms-to-leave-harmony-for-metaverse-focused-blockchain-164497
  10. The Block, "FBI confirms Lazarus Group and APT38 were responsible for $100 million bridge hack", 2023-01-23. https://www.theblock.co/post/204928/fbi-confirms-lazarus-group-and-apt38-were-responsible-for-100-million-bridge-hack
  11. CoinGecko, price page for JEWEL (live page). https://www.coingecko.com/en/coins/defi-kingdoms
  12. DeFi Kingdoms, official docs, "JEWEL Token". https://docs.defikingdoms.com/how-defi-kingdoms-works/power-tokens/jewel-token
  13. CoinDesk, "It's Lonely in the Metaverse: Decentraland's 38 Daily Active Users in a $1.3B Ecosystem", 2022-10-07. https://www.coindesk.com/web3/2022/10/07/its-lonely-in-the-metaverse-decentralands-38-daily-active-users-in-a-13b-ecosystem
  14. Hyperallergic, "The Metaverse Is Empty, and Legs Won't Save It", 2022-10-13. https://hyperallergic.com/metaverse-decentraland-is-empty
  15. Cointelegraph, "Metaverse housing bubble bursting? Virtual land prices crash 85% amid waning interest", 2022-08-08. https://cointelegraph.com/markets/metaverse-housing-bubble-bursting-virtual-land-prices-crash-85-amid-waning-interest
  16. Decrypt, "Yuga Labs Sees $561 Million in Otherside Ethereum NFT Sales Within 24 Hours", 2022-05-01. https://decrypt.co/99156/yuga-labs-sees-561-million-in-otherside-ethereum-nft-sales-within-24-hours
  17. Decrypt, "Yuga Labs Refunds Gas Fees For Failed Transactions During Bored Ape Otherdeed Mint", 2022-05-05. https://decrypt.co/99521/yuga-labs-refunds-gas-fees-for-failed-otherdeed-transactions
  18. Decrypt, "Bored Apes and Other Yuga Ethereum NFTs Are Shedding Value—Why?", 2024-03-11. https://decrypt.co/221261/bored-apes-yuga-ethereum-nfts-shedding-value-why
  19. ForkLog, "Alien Worlds: an in-depth look at a popular blockchain game", 2022-10-13. https://forklog.com/en/news/alien-worlds-an-in-depth-look-at-a-popular-blockchain-game
  20. Decrypt, on active wallets in crypto gaming, 2023-11-16. https://decrypt.co/206392/crypto-gaming-powers-up-daily-active-wallets-hit-million
  21. BlockchainGamer.biz, "Alien Worlds is first blockchain game with 100,000 players", 2021-04-09. https://www.blockchaingamer.biz/?p=15247
  22. App Developer Magazine, "NFT game Alien Worlds records almost 760K users", 2021-12-08. https://appdevelopermagazine.com/nft-game-alien-worlds-records-almost-760k-users/
  23. CoinGecko, price page for TLM (live page). https://www.coingecko.com/en/coins/alien-worlds
  24. Inven Global, "MIR4 Comprehensive Review", 2021-09-01. https://www.invenglobal.com/articles/15013/mir4-comprehensive-review
  25. Forkast, "Blockchain game MIR4 gains global popularity despite ban in South Korea", 2021-09-01. https://forkast.news/blockchain-game-mir4-gains-global-popularity-despite-ban-in-south-korea
  26. MIR4 Team (official post, devtrackers mirror), "New measure for bot removal from Hidden Valleys", 2021. https://devtrackers.gg/mir4/p/e0190f2f-new-measure-for-bot-removal-from-hidden-valleys
  27. Korea Economic Daily (KED Global), "Korea, game developers in tug of war over P2E genre", 2022-07-08. https://www.kedglobal.com/newsAmp/ked202207080018
  28. The Block, "Korean exchanges to delist gaming company Wemade's native token", 2022-11-24. https://www.theblock.co/post/189787/korean-exchanges-delist-wemade-native-token-wemix
  29. The Korea Times, "Financial authorities examine Wemix delisting", 2022-11-27. https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/biz/2022/11/126_340633.html
  30. The Korea Herald, "Court denies injunction against delisting of cryptocurrency Wemix", 2022-12-07. https://www.koreaherald.com/article/3016048
  31. Bae, Kim & Lee LLC, legal update on P2E games, 2023-01-31. https://www.bkl.co.kr/en/law/insight/newsletter/5356
  32. The Block, "Wemade's Wemix token plunges 60% after South Korean exchanges announce delisting", 2025-05-02. https://www.theblock.co/amp/post/352911/wemades-wemix-token-plunges-after-south-korean-exchanges-announce-delisting
  33. CoinDesk via Yahoo Finance, "GameFi Token BIGTIME Rallies 250% in First Week; Analysts Raise Supply Concerns", 2023-10-16. https://it.finance.yahoo.com/news/gamefi-token-bigtime-rallies-250-111630155.html
  34. Delphi Digital, "Big Time Pumps", 2023-10-12. https://members.delphidigital.io/feed/big-time-pumps
  35. Big Time, official wiki, "$BIGTIME Tokens". https://wiki.bigtime.gg/big-time-economy/economy-components/resources/usdtime-tokens
  36. Chainwire (sponsored press release on Decrypt), "Big Time Generates Over $100M in Revenue Since Preseason", 2024-03-28. https://decrypt.co/223851/big-time-generates-over-100m-in-revenue-since-preseason
  37. CoinMarketCap, price page for BIGTIME (live page). https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/big-time/
  38. Decrypt, "Ethereum NFT Game Illuvium Sells Over $72M in Digital Land Plots", 2022-06-06. https://decrypt.co/102139/ethereum-nft-game-illuvium-sells-over-72m-in-digital-land-plots
  39. eGamers.io, "Open Beta of Illuvium Delayed in Lieu of Bigger Release", 2021-08-31. https://egamers.io/open-beta-of-illuvium-delayed-in-lieu-of-bigger-release/
  40. Delphi Digital, "Mapping out Illuvium's Ecosystem", 2024-01-15. https://members.delphidigital.io/feed/mapping-out-illuviums-ecosystem
  41. Decrypt, "Long-Awaited 'Illuvium' Ethereum Games Launch on Epic Store", 2024-07-25. https://decrypt.co/241678/long-awaited-illuvium-ethereum-games-launch-epic-store
  42. BlockchainGamer.biz, "Illuvium refocuses on MMOG lite Overworld for 2025", 2024-12-20. https://www.blockchaingamer.biz/?p=36322
  43. CoinMarketCap, price page for ILV (live page). https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/illuvium/
  44. ForkLog, "Star Atlas to conduct token sales on FTX, Apollo-X and Raydium", 2021-08-24. https://forklog.com/en/star-atlas-to-conduct-token-sales-on-ftx-apollo-x-and-raydium/amp
  45. CoinDesk (video description), "Solana-Based Metaverse Gaming Platform Star Atlas Closes $2M in Public Token Sale", 2021-09-21. https://www.coindesk.com/video/solana-based-metaverse-gaming-platform-star-atlas-closes-2m-in-public-token-sale
  46. AiThority (press release), "Star Atlas Receives Over $3 Million Investment From Animoca Brands", 2021-12-26. https://aithority.com/technology/blockchain/star-atlas-receives-over-3-million-investment-from-animoca-brands/
  47. Decrypt, "Solana NFT Game Star Atlas Launches Playable Demo on Epic Games Store", 2022-09-29. https://decrypt.co/110881/solana-nft-game-star-atlas-demo-epic-games-store
  48. CoinMarketCap, price page for ATLAS (live page). https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/star-atlas/
  49. OneKey (wallet vendor blog; weaker source), "ATLAS Deep Research Report", updated 2025-11-18. https://onekey.so/blog/ecosystem/atlas-deep-research-report-token-roadmap-and-future-trajectory
  50. BlockchainGamer.biz, "Gods Unchained successfully raises $1.2 million including $300k esports prize pot", 2018-08-21. https://www.blockchaingamer.biz/news/5592/gods-unchained-successfully-raised-1-2-million-among-other-achievements/
  51. Decrypt, "Crypto gaming company behind Gods Unchained raises $15 million in Series A", 2019-09-23. https://decrypt.co/9524/crypto-gaming-company-gods-unchained-raises-15-million-series-a
  52. BlockchainGamer.biz, "Immutable sells out of Gods Unchained genesis card packs", 2019-10-30. https://www.blockchaingamer.biz/?p=13162
  53. CoinGecko Buzz (guide; weaker source), "How to Play Gods Unchained: Beginner's Guide", 2021-08-04. https://www.coingecko.com/buzz/how-to-play-gods-unchained-beginners-guide
  54. Vulcan Post, interview on Immutable and blockchain gaming, 2022-06-17. https://vulcanpost.com/791750/immutable-blockchain-gaming
  55. eGamers.io, "Gods Unchained Goes Play2Earn With Daily $GODS Rewards", 2022-08-23. https://egamers.io/gods-unchained-goes-play2earn-with-daily-gods-rewards/
  56. eGamers.io, "What Changes Are Coming to Gods Unchained With The New Daily Play & Earn Release?", 2022-08-24. https://egamers.io/what-changes-are-coming-to-gods-unchained-with-the-play-earn-release/
  57. Cointelegraph Magazine, "The social benefits are huge: Web3 gaming to shift digital ownership", 2022-10-19. https://cointelegraph.com/magazine/the-social-benefits-are-huge-web3-gaming-to-shift-digital-ownership
  58. CoinMarketCap, price page for GODS (live page). https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/gods-unchained/
  59. Gods Unchained, official blog, "August 2024 Dev Diary", 2024-08. https://portal.godsunchained.com/blog/august-2024-dev-diary
  60. eGamers.io, "Gods Unchained moves the Forge into the launcher with one-click fusing from November 4", 2026-10-28. https://egamers.io/gods-unchained-moves-the-forge-into-the-launcher-with-one-click-fusing-from-november-4/
  61. Splinterlands (official Hive account), "Ranked Rewards Updates Follow-Up", 2022-07-11. https://peakd.com/splinterlands/@splinterlands/ranked-rewards-updates-follow-up
  62. Splinterlands (official Hive account), "To the Splinterlands Community", 2022-11-17. https://peakd.com/splinterlands/@splinterlands/to-the-splinterlands-community
  63. BlockchainGamer.biz, "Splinterlands launches phase 1.0 of land expansion", 2023-04-10. https://www.blockchaingamer.biz/news/23523/splinterlands-land-expansion/
  64. Splinterlands (official Hive account), "SPS Staking Multiplier for Ranked Battle Rewards", 2023-07-04. https://peakd.com/splinterlands/@splinterlands/sps-staking-multiplier-for-ranked-battle-rewards
  65. BlockchainGamer.biz, "Splinterlands restructures, spinning out Genesis League Sports and Invennium", 2023-10-02. https://www.blockchaingamer.biz/?p=27448
  66. BlockchainGamer.biz, "CEO reckons 40 percent of Pixels' players are bots", 2023-11-22. https://www.blockchaingamer.biz/?p=28816
  67. BlockchainGamer.biz, "Pixels phasing out BERRY token as PIXEL launches via Binance", 2024-02-08. https://www.blockchaingamer.biz/?p=30297
  68. Decrypt, "'Pixels' Token Launch Date Set as Binance Reveals PIXEL Staking Rewards", 2024-02-08. https://decrypt.co/216550
  69. Decrypt, "What Is Pixels? Inside the Ronin Farming Game and Ethereum Token Airdrop", 2024-02-14. https://decrypt.co/217486/pixels-ronin-farming-game-airdrop-ethereum
  70. The Block, "Crypto video game 'Pixels' says it hit 1 million daily active users", 2024-05-13. https://www.theblock.co/post/294058
  71. BlockchainGamer.biz, "Pixels' chapter 2 release sees DAUWs drop 69% as bots get broken", 2024-07-03. https://www.blockchaingamer.biz/news/33087/pixels-chapter-2-release-see-dauws-drop-69-as-bots-get-broken/
  72. BlockchainGamer.biz, interview with Luke Barwikowski, "Pixels' CEO on what he's learnt from a year on Ronin and what's coming next", 2024-11-11. https://blockchaingamer.biz/features/interviews/35334/luke-barwikowski-pixels-one-year-on
  73. BlockchainGamer.biz, "Pixels isn't profitable … yet", 2025-01-16. https://www.blockchaingamer.biz/?p=36640
  74. CoinDesk via Yahoo Finance, "Thetan Arena Battles Axie Infinity in 'Play-to-Earn'", 2021-12-29. https://sg.finance.yahoo.com/news/thetan-arena-battles-axie-infinity-155128025.html
  75. M3TA.CL (Substack), "On-Chain Analysis: Thetan Arena Case", 2022-06-14. https://m3talab.substack.com/p/on-chain-analysis-thetan-arena-case
  76. eGamers.io, Thetan Arena game page (undated). https://egamers.io/games/thetan-arena/
  77. Naavik (quoting Kydo's Research Log), "April 4, 2022: Market Updates", 2022-04-04. https://naavik.co/digest/apr-4-2022/
  78. CoinGecko, "How to Play Pegaxy and What Are Vigorus and Pegaxy Stones", 2022-03-10. https://coingecko.com/learn/how-to-play-pegaxy-and-how-to-get-a-pega-beginner-s-guide
  79. Play2Moon, "Pegaxy: Low VIS Price Makes Game Community Demand Rebalancing", 2022-07-11. https://play2moon.com/pegaxy-low-vis-price-makes-game-community-demand-rebalancing/
  80. Cointelegraph, "Game on: Yield Guild Games scholarships on the rise through Q1", 2022-05-24. https://cointelegraph.com/news/game-on-yield-guild-games-scholarships-on-the-rise-through-q1
  81. Naavik, "Yield Guild Games (update)", 2022-07-11. https://naavik.co/digest/yield-guild-games-update/
  82. CCP Games (press release), "EVE Online Appoints In-World Economist", 2007-06-27. https://community.eveonline.com/news/news-channels/press-releases/eve-online-appoints-in-world-economist-1
  83. CCP, "The ETC is dead, long live the PLEX activation code", 2014-05-20. https://www.eveonline.com/fr/news/view/the-etc-is-dead-long-live-the-plex-activation-code
  84. CCP, "PLEX in my space? It's more likely than you think", 2010-07-09. https://www.eveonline.com/news/view/plex-in-my-space-its-more-likely-than-you-think.
  85. Engadget/Massively, "EVE Evolved: ISK sinks and faucets", 2010-10-24. https://www.engadget.com/2010-10-24-eve-evolved-isk-sinks-and-faucets.html
  86. CCP, "The EVE Online Ecosystem Outlook", 2020-03-30. https://www.eveonline.com/news/view/the-eve-online-ecosystem-outlook
  87. CCP, "Q1 2020 Economy Review", 2020-06-26. https://www.eveonline.com/news/view/Q1%20Economy%20Review
  88. CCP, "Monthly Economic Report - November 2024", 2024-12-12. https://www.eveonline.com/ja/news/view/monthly-economic-report-november-2024
  89. Roblox Newsroom, "RDC 2025", 2025-09-05. https://about.roblox.com/newsroom/2025/09/roblox-rdc-2025
  90. Roblox DevForum (official), "RDC25: What we announced", 2025-09-05. https://devforum.roblox.com/t/rdc25-what-we-announced/3920245
  91. Roblox Creator Hub, "Earn on Roblox" (current page). https://create.roblox.com/docs/production/earn-on-roblox
  92. Roblox Newsroom, "Roblox Fuels Next Wave of High-Fidelity Games for Over 18 Players, Increases Qualifying DevEx Rate by 42%", 2026-04-30. https://about.roblox.com/newsroom/2026/04/roblox-fuels-high-fidelity-games-over-18-players-increases-qualifying-devex-rate-42
  93. BlockchainGamer.biz, "Bright Star closes down MMORPG Ember Sword due to insufficient funding", 2025-05-23. https://www.blockchaingamer.biz/news/38830/bright-star-ember-sword-closed-down/
  94. Decrypt, "Ethereum's 'Ember Sword' Is the Latest in a Growing Wave of Crypto Game Shutdowns", 2025-05-22. https://decrypt.co/321686/ethereum-mmo-ember-sword-latest-crypto-game-shutdown